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INTRODUCTION 
Four decades ago, Congress passed the Clean Water Act, the most 
important legislation regulating water pollution in United States history.  
Surprisingly, attorneys, legal scholars, and judges still grapple with the 
level of criminal intent the Clean Water Act requires—the mens rea 
requirements—for a person to commit a Clean Water Act crime today.  
The prevailing “offense analysis” approach to assess the appropriate mens 
rea has produced inconsistent results in different courts for decades.  
Congress never considered whether to require proof that the defendant had 
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actual knowledge that his or her conduct violated any Clean Water Act 
provisions.  As a result, courts now use the Clean Water Act’s language to 
deal with environmental circumstances and changed prosecutorial 
priorities than Congress could never have contemplated when it passed the 
Act. 
This Article reviews environmental changes since the Clean Water 
Act and explains why most mens rea analysis of Clean Water Act crimes 
is indeterminate, resulting in federal courts of appeals remaining deeply 
and persistently divided on which standard to apply.  Over the decades, 
case law has expanded—not always consistently—on what constitutes a 
public welfare offense.  Public welfare offenses have been described as 
offenses that impose more stringent duties on those connected with 
particular activities that affect public health, safety or welfare, by not 
requiring proof of criminal intent for one or more elements of an offense.1  
Contrary to its general policies of resolving circuit court splits, the United 
States Supreme Court has denied judicial review—certiorari—time and 
time again.2 
This Article suggests that the Supreme Court continue to decline 
certiorari in a select group of important cases where it is unlikely that 
Congress and courts would be able to clarify the ambiguity.  The Article 
suggests a legislative solution to the Clean Water Act’s mental state 
requirements.  Congress, the political branch, should draft restyled 
criminal enforcement provisions that specify mens rea requirements for 
each individual element of the offense.  It is the role of the legislature, not 
courts, to define priorities in enforcing current violations, deterring future 
violations, and protecting defendants’ due process rights.  This Article 
provides a new approach to help Congress achieve these goals.  In doing 
so, Congress can make a fresh decision on how to balance enforcement 
and due process concerns. 
I. 40 YEARS OF CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT 
In 2012, the nation’s environmentalists celebrated the fortieth 
anniversary of the Clean Water Act.  The Clean Water Act legitimized the 
young U.S. environmental movement at a key time in its history and gave 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public 
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 323-24 (2003). 
 2 See United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 259 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 1600 (2013); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
Hopkins v. United States, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 
1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
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the even younger United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) the tools to punish polluters.3 
When Congress passed the Clean Water Act, two-thirds of U.S. water 
was so fouled by sewage, oil, pesticides and heavy metals that it was 
unsafe for swimming or fishing.4  Thirty percent of tap water samples 
exceeded federal limits for certain chemicals.5  Eighty-seven percent of 
U.S. swordfish samples contained so much mercury they were unfit for 
human consumption.6  In response to such findings, Senator Ed Muskie, 
the principal Senate sponsor of the 1972 Clean Water Act,7 proclaimed, 
“The cancer of water pollution was engendered by our abuse of our lakes, 
streams, rivers, and oceans; it has thrived on our half-hearted attempts to 
control it; and like any other disease, it can kill us.”8 
Over the last forty years, the country has made huge strides in 
reducing pollution from wastewater treatment plants and industries.9  
Many waterways are no longer dumping grounds for pollutants.  Forty 
years after passage of the Clean Water Act, sixty-five percent of U.S. 
waterways now pass the fishable and swimmable test.10  Now, 90.7 percent 
of U.S. community water systems meet “all applicable health-based 
standards.”11 
Despite the Clean Water Act’s successes, Congress has not amended 
the legislation since 1987.  As we learn more about how to protect human 
health and the environment, circumstances and public norms about the 
environment have changed.  Because of changed agricultural practices, the 
Clean Water Act has become less effective at dealing with runoff from 
cities, farms, and other intensive land uses.12  The drafters in the 1970s 
were not aware of new chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and hormone-
disrupting chemicals like parabens and BPA that can contaminate water.13  
Meanwhile, attention has shifted from environmental issues like sewage 
and stormwater to fracking, rare earths, and climate change.14  These 
                                                                                                                                     
 3 Russell McLendon, Clean Water Act Is 40 Years Old: Landmark Water Law Hits A 
Milestone During Critical Time, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/11/clean-water-act-2012_n_1874980.html. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n. 10 (1980) (referring 
to Senator Muskie as the principal Senate sponsor of the Act). 
 8 118 CONG. REC. 33,692 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972, at 161-
62. 
 9 McLendon, supra note 3. 
 10 McLendon, supra note 3. 
 11 McLendon, supra note 3. 
 12 McLendon, supra note 3. 
 13 McLendon, supra note 3. 
 14 McLendon, supra note 3. 
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changed circumstances have made it particularly difficult for modern 
courts to interpret Congress’s intent in 1972.  As the Clean Water Act 
continues to age, courts now use its language to deal with circumstances 
that Congress could never have contemplated when it passed the Act. 
Over the last few decades, the Supreme Court has frequently refined 
its definition of what a public welfare offense entails.15  Examples of 
public welfare offenses include sales of adulterated food, sales of 
misbranded articles, violations of anti-narcotics acts, criminal nuisances, 
violations of traffic regulations or motor-vehicle laws, and violations of 
general police regulations passed for safety, health, or wellbeing of the 
community.16 
In 1971, one year before the Clean Water Act’s passage, the United 
States Supreme Court considered in United States v. International 
Minerals & Chemical Corp. whether a defendant violated 49 C.F.R. 
§ 173.427 by transporting sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids.17  The 
former 18 U.S.C. § 834 provided that anyone who “knowingly violates 
any such regulation” such as the “transportation of any hazardous 
material” pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 173.427 would be fined or imprisoned.18  
The Court held that the defendant only needed to know about the 
transportation of the sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids to knowingly 
violate the statute, not that he was knowingly violating the particular 
regulation.19  Specifically, the International Materials Court stated that 
where apparently dangerous products are involved, such as sulfuric and 
hydrofluosilicic acids, “the probability of regulation is so great that anyone 
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must 
be presumed to be aware of the regulation.”20 
For thirteen years after Congress passed the Clean Water Act, the 
Supreme Court did not consider the implications of the lack of mens rea 
requirements on apparently innocent conduct.  Finally, in 1985, the Court 
in Liparota v. United States analyzed 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), which  
provided that “whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or 
possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by 
[the statute] or the regulations” would be guilty of a criminal offense.21  
The Court held that knowledge of illegality was essential because 7 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                                     
 15 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994); Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 
(1985). 
 16 Carpenter, supra note 1, at 327. 
 17 United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 559 (1971). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 564-565. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 420. 
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§ 2024(b)(1) could criminalize otherwise innocent conduct such as a food 
stamp recipient that “used stamps to purchase food from a store that, 
unknown to him, charged higher than normal prices to food stamp program 
participants.”22  Nine years later, the Court in Staples v. United States 
considered whether a defendant charged under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6), 
which criminalized unregistered firearms such as machine guns, must have 
known the firearm in question was an automatic weapon.  The Court 
focused on the harsh ten-year imprisonment penalty attached to violations 
of the statute as a “significant consideration in determining whether the 
statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea.”23 
Two decades later, the circuit courts finally attempted to interpret 
Congressional intent in resolving the Clean Water Act’s ambiguous 
mental state requirements.24  As explained in depth below, the federal 
circuit courts have applied the factors articulated in International 
Minerals, Liparota, and Staples without coming to a definitive conclusion 
on whether a Clean Water Act defendant needs to know what substance 
was being discharged to commit a Clean Water Act violation.  The circuit 
courts remain divided on which elements the mental state requirements 
apply to.25 
After forty-two years, the challenges of interpreting the Clean Water 
Act’s mens rea requirements have become enormously complex.  There 
are too many variables at play, and the legal grounds have shifted 
accordingly.  Without a reliable answer as to which mens rea requirements 
should apply, different interpretations of the Clean Water Act can lead to 
different results in its application.  For example, the defendant could be 
convicted for a felony if she knew that she had discharged a pollutant, or 
merely for knowledge that she discharged the substance regardless of 
whether she knew that the substance was a pollutant.  There is only one 
institution that can resolve the inherent ambiguity from the text combined 
with four decades of changing environmental, public, and judicial norms.  
That institution is Congress. 
Section II of this Article explains the confusion that arises from a 
linguistic analysis of the mens rea requirements under the Clean Water 
Act.  Section III turns to circuit court decisions over the past two decades 
that addressed the standard required to convict a defendant under the Clean 
                                                                                                                                     
 22 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. at 425-26. 
 23 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607-09 (1994). 
 24 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
 25 See United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541 
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Hopkins v. United States, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996). 
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Water Act, and finds courts deeply and persistently divided.  Section IV 
analyzes why despite the circuit split, the Supreme Court should continue 
to deny certiorari, and why Congress should re-draft the Clean Water Act’s 
criminal enforcement provisions.  Section V provides a framework to 
sharpen the issues that Congress should address in drafting new mens rea 
requirements for Clean Water Act crimes, and then examines the relevant 
policy considerations that Congress should consider, particularly as the 
considerations relate to enforcement and due process. 
II. LINGUISTIC AMBIGUITY IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
In drafting the Clean Water Act, Congress used the prevailing 
offense analysis approach of understanding mens rea, where each offense 
generally only has a single mental state.  As a result, linguistic 
interpretation does not clarify which elements the mens rea requirements 
apply to. 
Traditionally, the concurrence of two factors, an actus reus and mens 
rea, determine criminal liability.26  Courts presume in most cases that the 
defendant must possess a mens rea to commit a crime.27  Mens rea is best 
defined in what is known as “element analysis,” as a particular kind of 
criminal intent to commit an element of a crime.28  There is no common 
principle of universal application to discover the necessary mens rea for 
each element, because it is highly contextual.29  Few areas of criminal law 
pose more difficulty than determining the proper definition of the mens 
rea required for each element of any particular crime.30  Sometimes, it is 
difficult to determine what the elements of a particular crime are, in 
addition to what mens rea attaches to each of those elements.  For example, 
burglary requires the intent to commit a felony within a dwelling place at 
night.31  This intent, however, could refer to the intent to enter, the intent 
to act at night, the intent that the building be a dwelling place, or the intent 
to commit a felony within. 32 
Under the traditional offense analysis approach of understanding 
mens rea, as opposed to the more precise and more modern element 
analysis, each offense generally only has a single mental state.33  For 
example, under the Clean Water Act, “Any person who knowingly (or 
                                                                                                                                     
 26 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980). 
 27 In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 301 (Cal. 2000). 
 28 Paul H. Robinson, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model 
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 686-87 (1983). 
 29 Id. at 687. 
 30 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403. 
 31 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688. 
 32 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688. 
 33 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688. 
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negligently) . . . violates [a section] . . . shall be punished.”34  Section 
1319(c)(1)(A) only lists one mens rea requirement: “negligently.”  Section 
1319(c)(2)(A) only lists one mens rea requirement: “knowingly.”  
Congress has not defined the adverbs “knowingly” or “negligently” 
anywhere in the statute.35  As explained below, an offense analysis 
approach, present in the Clean Water Act, creates ambiguity in 
enforcement because different mens rea requirements may be intended to 
apply to different elements of an offense. 
Adding to the confusion of interpreting the Clean Water Act is the 
fact that inconsistent interpretations by attorneys, scholars, and even 
judges have rendered chaotic most distinctions between different kinds of 
culpability.36  Terminology relating to mens rea has been used so many 
different ways that they no longer have a set meaning.  Scholars continue 
to speak of “general intent offenses” and “specific intent offenses.”37  This 
is, however, overly simplistic, and may be misinterpreted.  General intent 
could mean criminal intent.38  General intent could encompass all forms 
of the mental state requirement.39  And general intent could also mean 
intent to do something on an undetermined occasion.40  Specific intent 
could mean the mental state required for a particular crime.41  Specific 
intent can mean that only one mental state of intent applies.42  Furthermore, 
specific intent could mean intent to do something at a particular time and 
place.43  As a result, this Article deliberately uses none of these terms in 
discussing the mens rea requirements. 
The Clean Water Act has three distinct mens rea requirements: 
negligent, knowing, and knowing endangerment.44  The first two of these 
are mens rea types recognized in the Model Penal Code—the third, 
“knowing endangerment,” is not.45  The Clean Water Act establishes 
separate sections for each type of violation.46  The two statutory provisions 
that relate to negligent and knowing violations are the focus of the majority 
                                                                                                                                     
 34 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(2). 
 35 United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th 1999). 
 36 Rebecca S. Webber, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did 
They Know and When Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53, 79 (1988). 
 37 Robinson, supra note 28, at 688 n.33 (citing examples). 
 38 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 201-202 (1972)). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(3) (2014). 
 45 Id.; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(3) (2014). 
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of the litigation over mens rea provisions and are the focus of this Article.  
Section 1319(c)(1)(A) states the law as it relates to negligence 
requirements: 
Any person who – (A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 
1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any 
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections 
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the 
Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a 
pretreatment program approved under section 1342(a)(3) or 
1342(b)(8) of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344 of 
this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, 
or by both.47 
Section 1319(c)(2)(A) states the law as it relates to knowing 
requirements: 
Any person who – (A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 
1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any 
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections 
in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the 
Administrator or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a 
pretreatment program approved under section 1342(a)(3) or 
1342(b)(8) of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344 of 
this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, 
or by both.48 
Each of the individual sections refers to acts and harms, and most 
provisions do not explicitly include any mens rea requirements.  To 
illustrate, § 1311(a) focuses on all effluent limitations: 
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.49 
Section 1318(b) relates to unlawful disclosures of confidential 
information: 
. . . Any authorized representative of the Administrator . . . who 
knowingly or willfully publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes 
                                                                                                                                     
 47 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 48 Id. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 49 Id. § 1311(a) (emphasis added). 
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known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any 
information which is required to be considered confidential under 
this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 1 year, or both.50 
Section 1321(b)(3) refers to unlawful discharge of oil or hazardous 
substances into U.S. waters: 
The discharge of oil or hazardous substances (i) into or upon the 
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into 
or upon the waters of the contiguous zone . . . in such quantities as 
may be harmful as determined by the President under paragraph 
(4) of this subsection, is prohibited . . . .51 
Finally, § 1342(k) concerns the national pollutant discharge 
elimination system: 
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be 
deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of 
this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this 
title, except any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title 
for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health.52 
For decades, courts have looked at the syntax to determine whether 
the mens rea requirement modifies “violates” in the Clean Water Act 
statute.53  The phrases “negligently violates” and “knowingly violates” 
appear in a different section of the Clean Water Act from the language that 
defines the elements of the offenses.54 The “negligently” or “knowingly” 
requirement is applied to every offense in sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 
1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, 1342, and 1345.  These sections, which define the 
offense elements, list the illegal actions, such as operating a source in 
violation of an applicable pretreatment standard,55 the discharge of oil or 
hazardous substances into U.S. waters,56 or the disposal of sewage sludge 
out of permit conditions.57 
In every one of the aforementioned offenses, the mens rea 
requirement could be understood linguistically to apply to one, some, or 
all of the requisite elements.  Each provision’s intent requirement has 
several distinguishable parts.  For example, in § 1311, the intent 
                                                                                                                                     
 50 Id. § 1318(b) (emphasis added). 
 51 Id. § 1321(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 52 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2014). 
 53 See e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 54 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319(c)(1)(3), 1321(b)(3), 1328, 1342, 
1345 (2014). 
 55 Id. §§ 1316(e), 1317(d) (2014). 
 56 Id. § 1321(b)(3). 
 57 Id. § 1311(h). 
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requirement could apply to the intent to discharge a substance, the intent 
to discharge a pollutant, the intent to discharge a pollutant out of 
compliance, and the intent to specifically violate that section.  Because the 
offense analysis approach does not recognize the multifaceted nature of 
the mental state for each offense,58 it is not viable in understanding which 
elements the Clean Water Act mens rea requirement applies to. 
Unfortunately, the statutory language has provided no guidance as to 
what the intent requirement applies to.  For example, the most natural 
grammatical reading of § 1319(c)(2)(A) suggests that the adverb 
“knowingly” modifies only the verb “violates,” which follows it.59  This 
seems to imply that the defendant needs to know that he or she is violating 
the law.  When Congress uses the language “knowingly violates” or 
“negligently violates,” however, the nouns that follow “violates” refer to 
section numbers that prescribe very different crimes.60  This could suggest 
that the defendant must knowingly violate all the elements of the offenses 
prescribed in those section numbers.61  Problematically, either 
interpretation would accord with ordinary usage.  As a result, the 
“negligent” or “knowing” intent in this provision is ambiguous, and 
subject to interpretation among prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. 
Although legislatures commonly draft ambiguous statutes because 
they do not draft in accordance to the clearer Model Penal Code, the Clean 
Water Act is unique.  Courts often resolve cases of ambiguity through 
various forms of statutory construction and legal doctrine.  The Clean 
Water Act’s ambiguous mens rea requirements, however, are particularly 
difficult to interpret because of its complex statute structure and time since 
enactment, which has resulted in decades of changed environmental 
circumstances and judicial norms. 
Realizing that the Clean Water Act inadequately regulated toxic 
pollutants, pollution from nonpoint sources, and stormwater discharges, 
Congress passed the Water Quality Act of 1987, which amended the 
original 1972 Act.62  In 1985, the House Report stated that the proposed 
amendments would provide penalties for individuals who “knowingly or 
negligently violate or cause the violation” of the Act’s requirements.63  In 
1986, the Senate Report spoke of a person who “causes a publicly owned 
                                                                                                                                     
 58 Robinson, supra note 28, at 689. 
 59 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (2014). 
 60 See e.g., id. § 1319(c). 
 61 See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 62 Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-A-Half Decades of 
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 566 (2005). 
 63 H.R. REP. NO. 189, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29–30 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 1004, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1986). 
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treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition in any 
permit issued to the treatment works.”64  Congress’s stated goal was to 
increase the criminal penalties to “reflect the commensurately serious 
nature of the violations to be criminally prosecuted under the Clean Water 
Act.”65 
In passing the Amendments, however, Congress made the mens rea 
requirements even less clear, using language that may or may not have 
eliminated mens rea requirements.  Because the lowest mens rea 
requirement governs, the word “cause” seems to imply that one or more 
elements lacks mens rea requirements, as one could cause a result without 
any knowledge.  It is unlikely, however, that Congress ever actually 
considered whether to require proof that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that his or her conduct violated any statutory provisions.  The 
legislative history and text is silent on whether Congress wanted to 
penalize a defendant who simply caused a violation.  As a result, the statute 
remained ambiguous when the circuit courts began to consider the issue in 
the 1990s. 
III. AN INDETERMINATE JUDICIAL SPLIT 
Courts have had great difficulty with complex statutes in which 
Congress has created an offense of “knowingly violating a regulation,”66 
such as the Clean Water Act.  Without consistent syntax or controlling 
legislative history, courts have made rulings based on the more abstract 
determination of whether the Clean Water Act constitutes a public welfare 
offense statute.  Under court doctrine, an offense is a public welfare 
offense when Congress intended that one or more elements of an offense 
have no mens rea requirement.67  Courts believe Congress intended to 
create a public welfare offense when the statute regulates dangerous and 
deleterious activities, lacks a mens rea requirement for an element, and 
inflicts a light penalty.68  If the Clean Water Act is a public welfare offense 
statute, the defendant does not need to know that it was a prohibited act in 
order to knowingly violate the Act.69  If the Act is not a public welfare 
offense statute, however, the defendant must also know that he discharged 
a dangerous and deleterious substance to knowingly violate the Act.70 
                                                                                                                                     
 64 See United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 65 Id.; see also H.R. NO. 1004 at 138. 
 66 See e.g., United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 67 Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: 
The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1210 (1995). 
 68 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952). 
 69 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 70 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607, n. 3 (1994) 
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Statutes are naturally limited by their choice of measures and their 
language.71  As a result, there may be several answers to a disputed issue 
of law.72  Virtually all canons of statutory interpretation have at least one 
counter-canon that could refute it.73  Nonetheless, courts resolve pervasive 
ambiguities in statutes, including criminal statutes, all of the time, making 
use of various canons and interpretive strategies.74  And once a federal 
court of appeals has clearly decided on an interpretation, lower courts 
bound by that decision must simply follow it to remain consistent with the 
Circuit Court’s ruling. 
Since 1993, the federal courts of appeals addressing the Clean Water 
Act mens rea requirements have split on whether the Clean Water Act 
constitutes a public welfare offense.  The Second, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits have all stated that the Act is a public welfare statute.75  The 
Second, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that the prosecution 
only needs to prove that the defendant knew of the prohibited act (the actus 
reus) was taking place—but not that the act was in fact prohibited.76  In 
contrast, looking at the same statutory language and legislative history, the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits require the government to prove that the 
defendant knew what was being discharged to commit a Clean Water Act 
violation.77 
Because Congress spoke in terms of “causing” a violation, the 
Second and Ninth Circuits held that the polluter does not need to be 
cognizant of the requirements or even the existence of the permit to violate 
the law.78  Both courts implied that following the grammatical rules strictly 
would defeat the stated remedial purpose.  The Fifth Circuit, however, 
declined to characterize the Clean Water Act as a public welfare offense, 
stating that Congress remained silent on whether mens rea was required.79 
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to address 
the Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements in United States v. 
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Weitzenhoff, in a case involving the discharge of waste activated sludge by 
a sewage treatment plant manager.80 The Ninth Circuit held that the sludge 
was analogous to the “deleterious devices or obnoxious waste materials” 
referenced in International Minerals and therefore, the government did not 
need to prove that the defendants knew that their acts violated the statute 
to be culpable.81 
In 1995, the Second Circuit affirmed Weitezenhoff when it analyzed 
the mens rea requirements in United States v. Hopkins, where the 
defendant tampered with wastewater samples that would be sent to 
independent laboratories for monitoring.82 The Second Circuit cited 
International Minerals and stated that the vast majority of the regulated 
substances, the need for a governmental permit, and the legislative goal to 
strengthen the criminal penalties in the 1987 amendments would alert a 
reasonable person to the likelihood of stringent regulation.83  The Second 
Circuit specifically noted that the Clean Water Act’s provisions regulate 
water quality related effluents,84 toxic pollutants,85 oil and hazardous 
substances,86 incinerator residue,87 munitions,88 chemical wastes,89 
biological materials,90 and sewage sludge,91 all substances that constitute 
dangerous and deleterious substances.92  Both the Ninth and Second 
Circuits emphasized that Congress drafted the Act’s criminal provisions 
to protect the public from the potentially dire consequences of the Act’s 
regulated activities, thus serving a remedial purpose.93  The Second and 
Ninth Circuits distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Staples by 
contrasting the apparent innocent ownership of guns to the handling of 
“obnoxious waste materials.”94 
In 1996, however, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ahmad 
reached a different conclusion in a case involving the defendant’s 
discharge of nearly five thousand gallons of gasoline into a city’s sewer 
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system.95  The Fifth Circuit distinguished the case from Weitzenhoff and 
Hopkins because the two prior cases dealt with the concept that ignorance 
of the law was not an excuse.96  In Ahmad, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
discharge of gasoline was no more harmful than the possession of machine 
guns in Staples and that the violation, punishable by years in prison, could 
not be a public welfare offense because public welfare offenses are 
generally punishable only by fines or short jail sentences.97 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that after 1985 that 
mens rea requirements apply to each of the statutory elements that 
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct, especially when Congress is 
silent on a mens rea requirement.98  The Clean Water Act regulates rock, 
sand, and cellar dirt that are discharged into water, conduct that appears to 
be innocent.99  Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of 
construction, the Fifth Circuit stated that because Congress left non-
dangerous items in the statute, it could not have intended the Clean Water 
Act to be a public welfare offense statute.100 
The Supreme Court had previously held that when Congress 
authorizes a severe penalty for a crime, it tends to suggest that Congress 
requires that a defendant must know the facts that make his conduct 
illegal.101  In United States v. Weitzenhoff, United States v. Hopkins, and 
United States v. Hanousek, the defendants appealed to request the U.S. 
Supreme Court to review the decision of the circuit courts through a 
petition for a writ of certiorari.102  The Supreme Court, however, denied 
certiorari to the Second Circuit’s decision in Hopkins and to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decisions in Weitzenhoff and Hanousek,103 in which the Ninth 
Circuit had affirmed Weitzenhoff.104  Not all Supreme Court Justices 
agreed.105  In Justice Thomas’s dissent to the denial of certiorari which was 
joined by Justice O’Connor, he stated that the Clean Water Act could not 
be a public welfare offense statute because the Act regulates a broad range 
of ordinary and industrial commercial activities and imposes some harsh 
penalties.106 
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Neither side has the more compelling reasoning based on the 
legislative history and the statute.  Given these rulings, it is difficult to 
predict how the other Circuit Courts would—or should—interpret the 
Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements.  In 1991, for example, the Sixth 
Circuit held that a Clean Air Act statute that uses the language “knowingly 
violates” requires only knowledge of the emissions themselves, not 
knowledge of the statute or of the hazards that emissions pose.107  This 
holding, however, preceded the Ninth Circuit in Weitzenhoff and did not 
refer to the Clean Water Act. 
IV. WHY THE SUPREME COURT MUST DENY CERTIORARI 
The Supreme Court should continue to deny certiorari on clarifying 
the Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements despite a general rule that 
makes circuit splits paradigmatic cases for granting certiorari.108  There 
have been dozens of disputes that arise from the Clean Water Act’s unclear 
mens rea standards.  Congress, however, has given the courts no legal tool 
to settle these disputes.  The Clean Water Act’s mens rea requirements are 
so open-ended in light of the changed circumstances that Congress should 
redraft those mens rea requirements.  If the Court decided this issue, it 
would be no more than a judicial flip of the coin.  Although the Supreme 
Court should typically review court splits, the Court should not do so when 
there is no governing law, and when circumstances have changed 
significantly. 
In many ways, this is an ideal circumstance for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari.  Officially, the Supreme Court Procedures state that the 
justices look primarily at the national importance of the question 
presented, the potential to resolve a split of opinion in the federal circuit 
courts, or the potential for the decision to have important precedential 
value.109  The Supreme Court has primarily granted certiorari under three 
scenarios.  First, when there is an actual conflict between the lower courts 
or between the lower court and a Supreme Court precedent.110  Second, 
when a lower court decision directly and substantially affects the federal 
government, or when the federal government is required to operate 
differently in various parts of the country due to decisional conflicts.111  
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Finally, when there are amicus curiae filed in support of or in opposition 
to the petition for certiorari;112 non-parties participate in the Court’s 
decision-making process through the submission of amicus curiae, or 
friend-of-the-court, briefs.113  In regards to the Clean Water Act’s mens 
rea requirements, there is an actual conflict between circuit courts. 
In particular, lower court and state court conflicts largely guide the 
certiorari decisions of the Court.  The number of cases involving a conflict 
rose from forty-five percent in the mid-1980s to sixty-nine percent in the 
mid-1990s and has remained at that level since.114  Under the Supreme 
Court Rules, the Supreme Court prioritizes “important” federal questions 
on which the lower courts have differed.115  The Court, however, has even 
resolved circuit splits on less important matters, like whether a complaint 
delivered by facsimile has been properly served.116 As a result, the 
scholarly debate on Supreme Court jurisprudence is moving away from 
when the justices grant certiorari to when the Justices should grant 
certiorari.117 
In fact, Justices have significant latitude in granting or denying 
certiorari.118 “Because decisionmaking at the certiorari stage is completely 
unfettered, the voting behavior of each Justice is constrained only by his 
or her own individual sense of what kinds of cases merit the Court’s 
attention.”119  Individual justices might be more inclined to grant or deny 
certiorari based on their own ideological predilections, and based on the 
likely outcome when ruling on the merits.120  Furthermore, the justices’ 
law clerks, who have some influence with justices but lack a broad outline 
of the Court’s trends, typically find a circuit conflict most worthy of 
certiorari in a petition for review.121 
In Arizona v. Evans, Justice Ginsburg favored a period of diverse and 
independent evaluations of a legal issue from different state and federal 
appellate courts before a better-informed and more enduring national 
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binding rule from the Supreme Court.122  Justice Stevens concurred, stating 
that “[T]here are decisionmakers other than judges who could perform the 
task of resolving conflicts on questions of statutory construction.”123 
Former Justice O’Connor favorably described a practice of letting issues 
‘percolate’ in the fifty states in the interests of federalism, although she 
qualified this interest in resolving emerging constitutional issues.124 
In contrast, Justice White had an unswerving view that the Court 
should not let circuit splits linger, stating that the “Court has a special 
obligation to intercede and provide some definitive resolution of the 
issues.”125  Former Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred, expressing that 
“Congress should not be held to have laid down one rule in North Carolina 
and another rule in North Dakota simply because [the lower courts] 
disagree with one another on the meaning of a federal statute.”126  
Although Justices O’Connor, White, and Rehnquist are no longer on the 
Supreme Court today, their views continue to shape the Court.   Legal 
scholars have not yet considered the circumstances as to when to grant 
certiorari when lower courts or state courts are divided, other than the need 
to focus on questions of national importance. 
This Article suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court decline certiorari 
in a narrow set of important cases where Congress and the courts have 
been unable to clarify the ambiguity in the first two decades with a 
consistent judgment.  In those cases, the social circumstances and judicial 
norms have substantially changed over the course of two decades and 
interpreting the statute becomes especially difficult and complex.  To that 
end, the Supreme Court should continue to deny certiorari on the Clean 
Water Act’s mens rea requirements.  As the Clean Water Act continues to 
age, courts apply evolved public welfare offense doctrine and new 
environmental norms to the Act’s language in ways that Congress likely 
never contemplated when it passed the Act in 1972. 
The Court cannot come with the “right” analysis for a “better” 
answer because legal doctrine and norms have substantially changed.  
Congress has not amended the Clean Water Act since 1987, over two and 
a half decades ago.  Despite the amendments, the Clean Water Act remains 
a complex statute with a single mens rea requirement for multiple separate 
criminal offenses.  Furthermore, the Clean Water Act’s mens rea 
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requirements remain indeterminate despite two decades of decisions, even 
though court decisions usually clarify ambiguous statutes over time.  The 
circuit courts’ decisions could have led to a compelling outcome.  The 
decisions, however, did not present more clarity on the mens rea 
requirements because of shifts in the understanding of what constituted a 
public welfare offense. 
There are concerns that without uniformity, similarly situated 
litigants would be treated differently in different circuits, and that multi-
state actors, such as corporations, would be forced to comply with 
divergent legal standards.127  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court does not 
need to resolve circuit splits on the Clean Water Act’s mens rea 
requirements when the law is still settled within the circuit.  Here, despite 
four decades of ambiguity, citizens have clear notice of how mens rea 
requirements are applied within the circuits that have decided on the issue. 
Instead, Congress should clarify the mens rea requirement so that it 
is not a true judicial coin toss.  It would be inappropriate for courts to infer 
that voters have a preference either way on whether there should be a 
specific mens rea requirement to an element of a Clean Water Act offense.  
As the moral authority of the country and a political branch that is 
accountable to voters, Congress should draft new mens rea requirements 
in accordance to a fresh set of policy choices that balance enforcement and 
due process concerns. 
V. REWRITING THE CLEAN WATER ACT IN LIGHT OF ELEMENT 
ANALYSIS 
A. Why Element Analysis is Encouraged 
The Clean Water Act criminal enforcement sections, more than most 
sections, must be rational, clear, and internally consistent, because a 
defendant faces possible imprisonment for violating a section.  A precise 
code that sufficiently defines forbidden conduct gives fair notice, both to 
law enforcement and defendants.128  Fair notice provides greater due 
process protection for defendants and increased fairness of penalties while 
reducing opportunities for arbitrary enforcement.129  At the same time, fair 
notice helps achieve the goals of condemning and deterring defendants 
from violating the law again.130 
To give fair notice of the prohibition’s scope to defendants, Congress 
can draft mens rea requirements in terms of each element rather than each 
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offense, a process known as element analysis.131  Element analysis helps 
provide the comprehensiveness, clarity, and precision to give fair notice 
of the minimum requirements necessary to commit a Clean Water Act 
criminal violation.132  Furthermore, element analysis eliminates the need 
for judicial statutory construction that may expand or reduce that scope.133  
Under element analysis, Congress would regain authority to define the 
criminal liability requirements in the Clean Water Act that it had 
previously delegated to the courts. 
Distilling the Clean Water Act provisions’ elements using the same 
examples as above illustrates why element analysis is appropriate: 
Section 1311: (1) Any person who (2) negligently or knowingly 
violates (3) this section or any permit condition or limitation (4) 
by causing (5) a discharge (6) of any pollutant (7) except in 
compliance with the Clean Water Act. 
Section 1318: (1) Any person who (2) negligently or knowingly 
violates (3) this section (4) by knowingly or willfully (5) 
publishing, divulging, disclosing, or make known (6) in any 
manner or to any extent (7) not authorized by law (8) any 
information (9) which is required to be considered confidential. 
Section 1321(b)(3): (1) Any person who (2) negligently or 
knowingly violates (3) this section (4) by causing (5) a discharge 
(6) of oil or hazardous substances (7) into or upon the navigable 
waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon 
the waters of the contiguous zone (8) in harmful quantities. 
Section 1342: (1) Any person who (2) negligently or knowingly 
violates (3) this section (4) by not complying (4) with a permit (5) 
issued, (6) except any standard imposed for a toxic pollutant 
injurious to human health. 
Each offense has several elements that are associated with only one 
culpable state of mind, creating a significant amount of confusion.  
Congress can refine an understanding of the mens rea requirements by 
adding detailed, precise definitions of the required culpable states of mind 
to each and every offense element in the Clean Water Act’s criminal 
enforcement provisions. 
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B. Recommendations for Mens Rea Under Element Analysis for the 
Clean Water Act 
Congress should redefine the mens rea requirements in accordance 
with the now fifty year old Model Penal Code, using only four mens rea 
terms: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.  Additional 
undefined terms would undercut clarity, consistency, and predictability.134  
A person would act “purposely” with respect to a result if his conscious 
objective and positive desire is to cause such a result.135  A person would 
act “knowingly” with respect to a result if it is not his conscious objective, 
but is practically certain that his conduct will cause that result.136  
“Purposely” would require that the defendant have a positive desire to 
cause the result, well beyond knowledge of a result’s near certainty in 
“knowingly.”137  A person would act “recklessly” with respect to a result 
if he consciously disregards a substantial risk of harm.138  A person who 
“recklessly” acts would be punished for taking risks, not for intentionally 
acting even with knowledge of the consequences.  A person would act 
“negligently” if she is unaware of a substantial risk that she should have 
perceived, a gross deviation from the reasonable person’s standard of 
care—gross negligence.139  In doing so, Congress should define the four 
mens rea terms in the Clean Water Act in a new definitions section, given 
the historic confusion of these mens rea terms. 
Congress should also redraft the language to express each element of 
a Clean Water Act crime in a separate and distinct word.  To do so, 
Congress will need to break the offense down into its material elements.  
Different elements of the same offense often require different culpability 
requirements.140  Each mens rea term should be defined in relation to each 
objective element of an offense, such as the conduct, the attendant 
circumstance, or the result.141  To guard against omissions, Congress can 
require a reckless mens rea for elements when it states no culpability 
term.142  Congress could exclude simple civil negligence as a mens rea 
requirement, given that the criminal negligence standard is already 
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consistent with the Department of Justice’s Principles of Federal 
Prosecution.143 
More precisely, Congress should apply mens rea requirements only 
to the conduct, rather than to the circumstance or result.  Otherwise, 
“knowing” conduct may always require that the actor be aware of every 
pertinent attendant circumstance of his conduct.144  Congress should define 
conduct elements literally to mean a single, actual physical movement of 
the actor, instead of combining them with circumstance elements.  The 
Clean Water Act uses terms that express both conduct and circumstance 
elements.  This combination creates ambiguities and undermines 
consistency in the Clean Water Act.145  For example, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 
says that the “Except as in compliance with . . . various sections . . . the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”146  The verb 
“discharge” is used to describe both an act and the result of that act.  When 
rephrased as “knowingly engaging in conduct in which the person 
recklessly releases a pollutant,” for example, it expresses greater clarity. 
Congress would not need to articulate any mistake or ignorance 
defenses after revising the Clean Water Act’s provisions.  Mistake 
suggests a wrong belief about a matter under the consideration, while 
ignorance implies a lack of knowledge about the matter.147  Under 
common law, a defendant may be excused from liability based on a 
mistake or ignorance of a fact.148 
“Under element analysis, however, determining whether a 
reasonable or an unreasonable mistake as to a particular circumstance will 
provide a defense requires nothing more than determining what culpable 
state of mind is required as to that circumstance element.”149  For example, 
any mistake negates purposeful or knowing conduct.150  Both unreasonable 
and reasonable mistakes negate reckless conduct; unreasonable mistakes 
would be better phrased as reckless mistakes.151  Reasonable mistakes 
negate negligent conduct; reasonable mistakes would be better phrased as 
negligent mistakes.152  Because the mens rea requirements will be clear for 
each element, Congress does not need to articulate mistake defenses. 
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Congress should draft the new Clean Water Act mens rea 
requirements to deter past and potential violators.  A primary purpose of 
the Clean Water Act is to ensure that offenders promptly return to 
compliance with the Act.153  A prosecutor, however, may have difficulty 
establishing an actor’s requisite mental state to convict him because intent, 
often the most difficult element to prove,154 must be shown indirectly from 
an actor’s statements and conduct.155  Therefore, Congress should draft 
mens rea requirements that are not too cumbersome for prosecutors to 
meet. 
Tough mens rea requirements convince corporations, which commit 
the overwhelming majority of antipollution law violations,156 to act more 
responsibly to avoid violating any Clean Water Act provisions.  
Companies would find it more difficult to treat criminal prosecutions as a 
cost of doing business by putting profits before environmental compliance 
and public safety.157  “Corporate officials are more likely to comply with 
the law when they fear that they may go to jail if their violations are 
discovered.”158  Moreover, tough mens rea requirements warn potential 
violators that they may also experience adverse criminal consequences for 
noncompliance. 
At the same time, however, Congress must also protect the 
defendant’s due process rights.  Under the Fifth Amendment, “[N]o person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without, without due 
process of law.”159  Because society aims to convict only guilty people, the 
new mens rea requirements should still presume a defendant’s innocence.  
When a defendant acted reasonably and without any intent to commit a 
crime, punishment serves no incapacitation, deterrence, or rehabilitation 
function.  As a result, Congress should make a distinction between 
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unwitting conduct and criminally culpable conduct by removing the 
possibility of elements lacking any mens rea requirements. 
To accommodate all of the aforementioned concerns, a person could 
commit a Clean Water Act felony if the person knowingly engages in 
conduct in which the person recklessly commits the action leading to 
reckless consequences: 
Section 1311: A person commits a Clean Water Act felony if the 
person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
recklessly releases a pollutant in violation of permit conditions or 
limitations in this Act, and the unlawful substance is recklessly 
released into U.S. waters. 
Section 1318: A person commits a Clean Water Act felony if the 
person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
recklessly gives confidential information not authorized by law 
through publishing, divulging, disclosing, or making known in any 
manner or to any extent. 
Section 1321(b)(3): A person commits a Clean Water Act felony 
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
recklessly releases oil or hazardous substances, and the substance 
is recklessly discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the 
United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of 
the contiguous zone in harmful quantities. 
Section 1342: A person commits a Clean Water Act felony if the 
person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
recklessly fails to comply with a permit issued, except for any 
standard imposed for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health. 
This proposal would not require that a defendant have knowledge of 
the conduct, circumstance, and the result, which would make enforcement 
especially difficult; the defendant need only consciously disregard a 
substantial risk of harm.  At the same time, defendants only face possible 
prison time when they have a “reckless” state of mind as to the 
circumstance and result elements, a more forgiving standard than what the 
Second and Ninth Circuits currently require.  Imprisonment would require 
that the person knew that what he or she was doing violated the law but 
chose to ignore a substantial and unjustifiable risk.  A defendant who made 
an honest mistake and did not genuinely realize that their conduct could 
cause harm should not be morally culpable under the Clean Water Act. 
Meanwhile, a person could commit a Clean Water Act misdemeanor 
for a negligent state of mind as to the circumstance and result elements, 
rather than a recklessness standard: 
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Section 1311: A person commits a Clean Water Act misdemeanor 
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
negligently releases a pollutant in violation of permit conditions or 
limitations in this Act, and the unlawful substance is negligently 
released into U.S. waters. 
Section 1318: A person commits a Clean Water Act misdemeanor 
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
negligently gives confidential information not authorized by law 
through publishing, divulging, disclosing, or making known in any 
manner or to any extent. 
Section 1321(b)(3): A person commits a Clean Water Act 
misdemeanor if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which 
the person negligently releases oil or hazardous substances, and 
the substance is negligently discharged into or upon the navigable 
waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon 
the waters of the contiguous zone in harmful quantities. 
Section 1342: A person commits a Clean Water Act misdemeanor 
if the person knowingly engages in conduct in which the person 
negligently fails to comply with a permit issued, except for any 
standard imposed for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health. 
This proposal lowers the mens rea requirement from “reckless” to 
“negligent” in regards to the prohibited action when it is a misdemeanor.  
Because defendants would only face fines and probation time rather than 
possible imprisonment, however, the balance between competing interests 
shift towards enforcement, given the Act’s significant regulation of 
dangerous and deleterious substances.  These mens rea requirements 
would be consistent with the idea that defendants only need to know about 
the emissions, not knowledge of the statute or the hazards that the 
emissions pose. 
This proposal remains consistent with Supreme Court decisions 
which hold that mens rea requirements should apply to each of the 
statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.160  
Furthermore, proving that a defendant is grossly negligent is higher than 
the current standard that “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that 
a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in the same 
situation.”161  Therefore, proving that a defendant grossly deviated from 
                                                                                                                                     
 160 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 471 (1985). 
 161 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004). Four Circuit Courts hold that 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) requires only proof of simple negligence for Clean Water Act 
negligence violations. See United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 259 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013); United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 2012); 
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the reasonable person’s standard of care remains a sufficiently high 
standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The prevailing “offense analysis” approach for analyzing the 
appropriate mens rea for Clean Water Act offenses has produced 
inconsistent results in different courts for decades.  Congress never 
considered whether to require proof that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that his or her conduct violated any of the statutory provisions.  
And in forty years, the focus and priorities of criminal prosecution under 
the Clean Water Act have changed, creating circumstances that Congress 
could never have contemplated when it passed the Act. 
Even as federal courts of appeals remain deeply and persistently 
divided on which mens rea standard to apply, this Article nonetheless 
suggests that the Supreme Court continue to decline certiorari.  The 
Supreme Court should decline certiorari in a narrow set of important cases 
where Congress and the courts have been unable to clarify the ambiguity 
in the first two decades with a consistent judgment.  Instead, Congress 
should redraft the mens rea requirements necessary to commit a Clean 
Water Act crime.  To do so, Congress should not only make the value 
judgments, but also implement the clarity of “element analysis” by 
attaching a particular mental state to each and every offense element in the 
Clean Water Act.  It is the role of the legislature, not courts, to define 
priorities in enforcing current violations, deterring future violations, and 
protecting defendants’ due process rights. 
To that end, Congress should use a “knowing” standard for conduct 
elements and a “recklessness” standard for circumstance and result 
elements for Clean Water Act felonies.  The “negligence” standard would 
apply for Clean Water Act misdemeanors in terms of circumstance and 
result elements.  In doing so, Congress can resolve four decades of 
confusion. 
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